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INTEREST RATE RISK AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY FOR
TRADITIONALBANKS ANDFINANCIALINTERMEDIARIES
Abstract
Traditionally,banks and financial intermediaries borrow short
and lend long. This causes a risk of negative net worth (and failure,
under simplifying assumptions), because the present discounted value
of the assets is more volatile than that of the liabilities.
This paper utilizes a new option pricing model for speculative
assets whose log price relative is a symmetric stable Paretian random
variable. This model is used to empirically evaluate the probability
of failure and fair value of deposit insurance as a function of capital—
asset ratio for a bank with demand liabilities and longer term, default—
risk—free, perfectly marketable assets. The maturities used for the
assets range from three months to 30 years (in order to incorporate
thrift institutions). Implications for reserve requirement policy and
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation, and various state Mutual Savings
Bank insurance plans guarantee deposits in banks and kindred
financial intermediaries against many kinds of risk. To mention
a few of these, we nave the risk that the bank's management will
be dishonest or incompetent, residual undiversified default risk,
illiquidity risk which arises from the imperfect marketability
of the bank's assets, foreign exchange risk, and finally, pure
interest rate risk.
In this study, we address only the last of these types of
risk. We do not deny that tne other categories are important,
often more important than pure interest rate risk. However, the
pure interest rate risk is particularly interesting in viewof
the traditional practice of financial intermediaries of "trans-
forming maturities" by borrowing short and lending long. We
quantify the value of this insurance empirically, using a
Paretian stable option pricing model.
These results can be applied in one of two ways. Currently,
banks all pay a given premium to the insuring agency, and are
subjected to a more or less arbitrary set of regulations regarding
capital structure and activities, intended to make them fairly
safe from failure. Mayer (1965) has proposed a graduated deposit
insurance plan, under which banks would be allowed (within reason)
to take whatever capital position and risks they choose, and in
exchange would be required to pay a premium that covered the fair2
value of insurance for the risk category chosen. Given the
riskiness of the bank's activities, the fair value of such insurance
will decline as the bank's capital-asset ratio increases, because
the more capital the bank has, the larger the share of any losses
on the assets that will be borne by the bank's stockholders, rather
than by the insuring agency. Therefore, for any given premium
and riskiness of operations there will be some amount of capital
that will be adequate to make the premium in question cover the
fair value of insurance for the bank. Sharpe (1978) has proposed
that this be the criterion for deciding whether or not a given
bank's capital is "adequate." There is no essential difference
between the two proposals, since they are just two ways
of interpreting the same underlying relationship between
permissible risk, adequate capital, and fair premium. S
CAPITAL AND THE DIVISION OF LOSSES
To simplify the analysis, we will concentrate on a "tradi-
tional bank," which has demand or virtually demand liabilities,
and longer term assets. We will assume these assets are perfectly
marketable with no transactions costs, and that there is no risk
of default or possibility of being called before maturity. At
first we will assume that the bank's entire portfolio is invested
in one type of asset, and in one maturity. Later we will relax
many of these assumptions.
Let A0 be the initial value of the bank's assets and L0 be
the initial value of its liabilities, so that3
C =A0-L0 (1)
is the initial economic value of its capital. Define
q =C/A0 (2)
as its initial capital-asset ratio, so that
L0 =A0(l-q). (3)
Let A be the random value of the bank's assets when it is
next examined. If A is greater than A0, so that the bank has
excess capital, we assume the bank will be allowed to distribute
this excess capital to shareholders in order to return its capital-
asset ratio to q. If it is less than A0, the examiners will
require the shareholders to restore the deficient capital. If
they do not, the bank will be liquidated. The shareholders could
restore the capital by putting up more money of their own, by
selling new stock on the open market so as to dilute tneir own
stock, or by following a policy of retaining some of the anti-
cipated return on tne assets as a buffer against unanticipated
capital losses. As long as A is above L0, so that their stock
has positive net worth, tney will choose to replenish the capital
by one of these means. However, if A is below L0 (tnat is, if A/A0
is below l-q), they will (abstracting from tile value of the
bank's charter and customer relationships) prefer to abandon the
bank and let the insuring agency pay off the depositors, taking
a loss of L0 -A.Since the shareholders reap the unanticipated
capital gains if A is unusually high, but do not take all the4
losses if A is unusually low, the insuring agency would have to
charge some positive insurance premium I in order to compensate
itself for the risk of having to take up part of the losses.
This premium should be retained by the party guaranteeing
the deposits even in years when there are no failures, since
the risk cannot be expected to average out over banks in any
given year. Insurance against loan default or against embezzle-
ment may behave to a large extent like casualty insurance, in
wnich the premiums can be expected to pay off the losses in eacti
year, but insurance against interest rate risk is undiversifiable.
In most years, no banks will fail from this cause, but occasion-
ally -onceevery 10 or 100 years, depending on ttie risks the
banks take -allthe banks will be in trouble.
.
THEVALUE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Formally, deposit insurance is equivalent to an option on
the bank's assets. Deposit insurance essentially gives the
banking firm (construed to include both depositors and share-
holders) a "put" option, entitling it to sell the bank's assets
to the insurer at a prearranged "execution price," determined by
the nominal value of the bank's liabilities. The liability-asset
ratio, l-q, may therefore be thought of as the execution price-
current price ratio in a put option contract.
Robert Merton (1977) has thus applied the well-known Black-
Scholes option pricing formula to the problem of evaluating bank
deposit insurance. However, this formula relies on the strong
assumption that A is log-normal. The distribution of most prices,
including the prices of interest-bearing securities, seems to be5
much too fat-tailed or leptokurtic to be consistent with a simple
normal or log-normal distribution.
We therefore assume that the logarithm of A is instead
distributed according to the symmetric Paretian stable class of
distributions, whose use in financial applications has been
pioneered by Mandelbrot (1963), Fama and Roll (1968, 1971), and
Roll (1970). If A itself had a symmetric stable distribution,
there would be a small but positive probability that the value
of the assets would actually go negative. By making its logarithm
symmetric stable, we eliminate this possibility.
Symmetric stable distributions are characterized by three
parameters: the "characteristic exponent" .,whichgoverns how
fast the tails taper off, the "standard scale" c, which roughly
equals the semi-interquartile range, and the mean.
The characteristic exponent may range between 0 and 2, though
in financial applications it is ordinarily assumed to be between
1 and 2. When it equals 1, the Cauchy distribution results, and
when it equals 2, the normal (Gaussian) distribution is obtained.
Except in the limiting normal case, the variance is infinite,
which is why we must use the "standard scale" in place of the
standard deviation to characterize its spread. If we were to
restrict ourselves to the normal distribution, we would greatly
underestimate the probability of a large, sudden change in the
value of the bank's assets, and hence would greatly underestimate
the fair value of insurance.
Figure 1 shows how the bell-shaped probability density function
of the symmetric stable distribution changes with a. In all three
cases, the standard scale is chosen to be 1.0, so that the probability
is roughly 0.5 thatwill lie between +1 and -l on the horizontalFi9ure 1
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axis. When aisless than 2.0, the curve has a higher mode, lower
shoulders, and higher tails than the familiar normal distribution.
Note that the normal density virtually disappears by i =5.0.
Figure 2 shows how the stable density function is affected by
the scale parameter c. In each case, the characteristicexponent
equals 1.5, the intermediate case of Figure 1. If c is 2.0 instead
of 1.0, the distribution has the same shape, but is twice asspread
out (and has only half as high a mode, in order to continue to integrate
to unity). When c is 0.5 instead of 1.0, it is more squeezed together.
The mode is now at .576, which is offscale in Figure 2. Note that the
tails are still perceptibly above zero at i= 6.0,which corresponds
to 12 standard scales. For the normal distribution (a =2.0), the
standard scale exactly equals the standard deviation divided by /,
sothat 54.7 percent of the probability density lies between +c and-c.
For the Cauchy distribution (a=1.0),exactly 50 percent of the S probability density lies between +c and -c.
In two papers, the present author has developedsome of the
properties of stable distributions in a continuous timecontext,
and has developed an option pricing formula basedon the log-
symmetric stable distribution. In continuous time thesample
path of a process governed by these distributions is full of
discontinuities. Therefore even if the regulatorsare continually
vigilant--essentially examining the bank continuously--there is
some possibility that the value of the bank's assetsmay change
so suddenly that net worth will be deeply negative beforethey
have a chance to close it. If the bank's assets fell in value,
but not by enough to wipe out its capital, theregulators could
•
either insist on a capital injection or else raise the
premium for insurance in keeping with the deteriorated capital
ratio of the bank. Therefore, with continuous examination, the










large enough to wipe out the bank's capital; that is, a change
A,.,
in log A greater than log =-log(l-q).In McCulloch (1978a),
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where c0 is the standard scale of log Athataccumulates in one
year, and k is a constant (depending on cL) that is tabulated in
that article. For the sake of illustration, k1 =.6366,
k15 =.3989,and k2 =0.(Since k2 =0,a normal diffusion
process never, with probability 1, has discontinuities.)
When a change in the value of the bank's assets sufficiently
large to close the bank suddenly occurs (or is suddenly perceived
to have already occurred), the change is likely to have been
more than large enough to have wiped out the bank's capital,
imposing some losses on the insuring agency. In McCulloch (1978b)
it is shown that the fair value of these losses is given by
=AH(l-q,c)dt, (5)
0
where H( )isa function which is tabulated in that article, I is
insurance, and dt is the life of the "option" (or examination
period), which approaches 0. Thus the value per year of insurance,
computed (as is conventional) as a fraction of liabilities, is
=I =AH(l—g,
6 L0d l-q
This equation, in conjunction with (4), tells us how to compute
the fair value of insurance from q, a, and
c0.10
THE DATA
In order to evaluate formulas (4)and(6),weneed empiri-
cal values for c0 and a for idealized default—free, perfectly
marketable assets, of various maturities. U.S. Treasury secur-
ities are default-free, and very highly marketable, so we will
use their empirical behavior as a proxy for the idealized assets
we desire.
For each of several key maturities, we would like estimates
of c0 and a for three types of asset a bank or thrift institution
might hold: single payment or "discount" instruments, "par bonds",
by which we mean coupon bonds that happen to be selling exactly
at par, and "amortized" loans that pay a constant amount each
month with no balloon at final maturity. We cannot use raw
Treasury securities price behavior to estimate these parameters
directly, since the Treasury issues no marketable amortized
securities, since its discount instruments (Treasury bills) have
maturities only out to one year, and since most outstanding
Treasury bonds are ordinarily selling substantially above or below
par, depending on their coupon rates, and in any event, do not
coincide with the key maturities we would like to investigate.
However, we can bypass this problem by curve—fitting a
"discount function" to empirical Treasury quotations, and using
this smooth function to construct a synthetic price for any
type or maturity of security we care to define. For this pur-
pose we employ the author's cubic—spline term structure curve—
fitting program, developed wnile at NBER-West. This version of11
the program is a modification of the tax-adjusted term structure
program developed in 1973 for the U.S. Treasury, and described
in McCulloch (1975 ).Thenew modifications account precisely
for the fact that the coupons on Treasury bonds arrive semi-
annually. For the sake of convenience and computational speed,
the version developed for the Treasury assumed a continuous stream
of coupons, which slightly distorts the shape of the term structure
in the maturities where bonds and bills interface.
The data base we have available consists of bid and asked
quotations for U.S. Treasury securities for the last business
day of each month, from the end of December 1946 to the end of
May 1977, a total of 366 months. Since these dates represent the
dividing line between two months, they could equally well be
associated with either month. We will refer to them in this paper
as representing the "beginning" of the subsequent month, i.e.,
January 1947 to June 1977. In fact, the quotations are for actual
delivery and payment early in these months, about two business
days after the quotation date. The data for January 1947 to April
1966 were collected by Reuben A. Kessel from the quotation sheets
of Salomon Brothers, and were processed under thesupervision
of Merton H. Miller and Myron Scholes. The data forMay 1966
to June 1975 were collected from Salomon Brotners quotation
sheets by Joel Messina and obtained with the assistance ofJay
Morrisson. The data for July 1975 to June 1977 were collected
from Wall Street Journal composite dealer quotationsby Krista
Chinn under the direction of the present author.12
All tax—exempt securities were rejected as beingnon-
representative of the market as a whole.(By the mid-1950's all
but a handful of these had disappeared). "Flower bonds" often
sell at a price premium because they can be surrendered atpar
value in payment of estate taxes if they are owned by the
decedent at the time of his death. It was notpractical to omit
all of them,. because for many years they constituted most if not
all of the long—term securities. The following compromise was
adopted for flower bonds: Those that 1) were selling below par;
2) matured after 1982; and 3) were selling within $4 per $100 of
face value of the lowest priced flower bond were excluded. Any
that did not meet all three of these criteria were included.1
No attempt was made to compensate for the price discount that
existed on many bonds in the earlier part of the period because
of their ineligibility for commercial bank purchase. This dis-
count was greatly reduced after the Accord of March 1951, and
most of these bonds became eligible by the mid-1950's. Except
for the tax—exempts and selected flower bonds, almost all U.S.
Treasury Bills, Notes and Bonds were included. It would have
been desirable in principle to exclude callable bonds, but this
was not practical, since they constitute almost all of the
longer—term securities for many years. Therefore they were
treated as maturing on the final maturity date if selling below
par, and as maturing on the call date if selling above par.
1See McCulloch (l975a,817-822) for further discussion of
these estate tax bonds. S13
For each time t, a discount function S (t, m) was fit to
the bid-asked mean prices of the securities available.This
function gives the present value, as a fraction ofunity, of a
dollar to be repaid after maturity m, i.e., at future timet+m.
The price a(t, m) of an amortized loan payingone dollar per
year in continuous installments for m years can be derived from
the discount function as follows:
in
a(t, m) =f(t,ji)dji. (7)
0
Finally, the par bond yield y(t, m) that gives thecoupon rate
(as a fraction of unity) that would benecessary to make a con-
tinuous—coupon bond just sell at par can be derived as follows:
—1—6(t,m)
(8) Y ,m,—a(t,m)
A batch version of the FORTRAN IVprogram that was used to
curve—fit tne term structure, together with series from which
ó(t., m), y(t, m), and a(t, m) can be readily derived,are avail-
able from the NBER in New York, and further documentationwill
be available in the near future. The NBER takesno responsibility
for either the program or the data, however.14
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
At time t, a pure discount security with maturity At can be
purchased for 5(t, At) dollars. At time t +At,it can be sold
(i.e. cashed, since it has just matured) for 1 dollar. The log
price relative on this investment is
log(t,At)
=— log (t, At). (9)
The log price relative over the same holding period of duration
At on an investment in a security with any longer maturity is
random, since it depends on an unknown future price. However,
its expected value will approximately equal (9), since investors
have the option of investing in any maturity, and compare expected
returns on all of them. In practice, the expected log price
relative will be slightly higher, the longer the maturity, be-
cause of a reliable, but small, liquidity premium.(See McCulloch,
1975b) Therefore the realized log price relative on a longer
maturity security, minus expression (9) (i.e., plus log o(t, At)),
will equal the unanticipated return plus a small, relatively
constant liquidity premium. For a pure discount security with
initial maturity m, this difference is given by
log
cS(t+At, rn-At)+ log á(t, At), (10)
since after At has elapsed, it can be sold for 6(t +At,m -At).
For coupon bonds and amortized loans, our problem is some- S
whatcomplicated by the payments that arrive during the folding15
period, i.e. between t and t +At.We will therefore consider
the log price relatives of modified bonds and amortized loans,
that have had these first few payments removed. Such a modified
par bond can be purchased at time t for 1 -y(t,m) a(t, At).
When it is sold at t +At,its principal is worth 6(t +At,m -At),
and its coupons are worth y (t, m) a (t +At,m -At),so the
amount by which its log price relative exceeds that on a discount
security with maturity At is given by
ó(t +At,m -At)+y(t,m) a(t +At,m—At) og —y(t,m) a(t, At)
+log6(t, At). (11)
Our modified amortized loan can be purchased at time t for
a(t, m) —a(t,At), and sold at t +Atfor a(t +At,m -At),
so the relevant difference is given by
loga(tm)— aCt At)
+logcS(t, At). (12)
The monthly standard scalecimo and the characteristic
exponent of the unanticipated returns were estimated for each
of the three types of asset using the methods suggested by Fama
and Roll (1971), for both the entire post—Accord period (roughly
the last 26 years), and for the last 10 years. Prior to the
Accord of March 1951, the Federal Reserve System artificially
stabilized interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities. Since
that period is not representative of what may be expected in16
years to come, we did not make any use of that part of our data
set. Table 1 shows our standard scale estimates, based on the
.28 and .72 fractiles of the distributions of expressions (10)-
(12). In Table 1, these values are multiplied by 100 in order
to express them as percentage unanticipated changes. These
figures mean that in roughly half the months observed, the
unanticipated capital gain or loss on the asset indicated was
within the value indicated, as a percent of the initial value of
the asset. The standard scale for unanticipated changes accumu-
lated over one year, c0, can be computed from these values by
equation (13), to be introduced presently.
In Figures 3 and 4, these standard scale estimates are
plotted versus maturity on double logarithmic graph paper. We
see that for maturities under one year, discount instruments andS
par bonds are virtually indistinguishable, but that the difference
becomes important after five years or so. Amortized loans behave
very much like par bonds with half the terminal maturity.
For the post—Accord period, we have a full 314 observations
for maturities 10 years or less, 274 observations for the 20
year maturity, and only 64 observations for the 30 year maturity.
In Figure 1, which is based on this period, we see that the 20
year maturity standard scales lie almost on a straight line extra—
polated from the 5 and 10 year points, at least for discounts
and par bonds. The 30 year standard scales seem not to lie on
the curve derived from the shorter maturities. We attribute
this to the fact that we have only a highly curtailed sample
for the 30 year maturity, which apparently is not representative17
Table 1.




Maturity Instruments Bonds Loans
Last 26 years (post-Accord)
3mo .0282 .0281 .01609
6mo .0698 .0695 .0333
lyr .141. .1378 .0686
2yr .280 .268 .1435
5yr .588 .523 .277
lOyr .861 .698 .481
2Oyr 1.29 .878 .648
3Oyr 1.28 .849 .605
Last 10 years
3mo .0462 .0459 .0254
6mo .1159 .1137 .0684
lyr .253 .247 .1241
2yr .492 .465 .264
Syr .866 .730 .492
lOyr 1.280 .945 .695
2Oyr 2.91 1.437 1.132
3Qyr
2Oyr* 1.887* 1.223* .980*
3Oyr* 2.45* 1.422* 1.199*
*extrapolatedFigure 3
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of the period as a whole. We therefore believe that if we had
a full 314 observations for the 30-year maturity, its standard
scale would lie on a relatively straight line, or at least on a
smooth curve, with the shorter maturities, when plotted on double
logarithmic graph paper.
For the past 10 years, the sample falls off even faster.
We have a full 120 observations for maturities 10 years or less,
85 observations (some 30% fewer) for the 20yearmaturity, and
no observations at all for the 30 year maturity. We see from
Figure 4 that here even the 20 year maturity standard scales do
not seem to line up with the shorter maturity standard scales.
We attribute this to the fact that the 20 year maturity sample
size is more curtailed, in percentage terms, and therefore less
representative, here than for the post-Accord period. If we had
a full 120 observations for the 20 and 30 year maturities, it
seems reasonable to believe that they would lie on a straight
line extrapolated from the 5 and 10 year points. These maturities
are of potential interest, especially in the case of thrift insti-
tutions, so it is important that we have reasonable estimates
for these values. The straight line double logarithmic extrapola-
tions seems more reasonable than the curtailed—sample actual
estimates, so we will use the extrapolated values to evaluate our
formulas for these maturities. These extrapolated values are
indicated with asterisks, in Table 1.
Table 2 shows estimates of the characteristic exponent,










3mo 314 1.36 1.36 1.52
6mo 314 1.43 1.44 1.39
lyr 314 1.25 1.24 1.24
2yr 314 1.27 1.29 1.31
5yr 314 1.35 1.35 1.24
lOyr 314 1.28 1.28 1.35
2Oyr 274 1.33 1.38 1.36
3Oyr 64 1.49 1.62 1.59
3mo 120 1.54 1.54 1.65
6mo 120 1.52 1.51 1.77
lyr 120 1.41 1.41 1.45
2yr 120 1.47 1.47 1.52
5yr 120 1.35 1.35 1.48
lOyr 120 1.39 1.32 1.36
2Oyr 85 1.70 1.60 1.69
3Oyr 022
estimator ofis omputed from the .05 and .95 fractiles of the
observed distribution. Except for the curtailed-sample 30-year
maturity, most of the estimates for the last 26 years lie in the
range 1.24 to 1.39. The values for the last 10 years are
considerably higher. Except for the curtailed-sample 20-year
maturity and amortized loans with 3 to 6 monthst maturity (not
an important class of assets), most of the estimates lie in the
range 1.35 to 1.52.
Examination of the raw data suggests that the volatility of
interest rates has been relatively constant over the last 10
years, while it has undergone significant changes over the last
26 years. The early 1950's and 1960's were periods of relatively
low interest rate volatility, while the late 1950's and the most
recent 10 years were periods of relatively high interest rate
volatility. When stable variables having the same characteristic
exponent but different standard scales are mixed together, the
resulting sample distribution tends to have fatter tails than do
the distributions of the variables thus mixed. The estimator
c95 would therefore tend to comeout lower than the true char-
acteristic exponent of the distributions generating the variables
mixed. This may explain why the estimates for the last 26 years
come out lower than for the last 10 years: Unanticipated re-
turns may have had a relatively constant characteristic exponent
in the range 1.35 to 1.52, but a standard scale that has changed
gradually over time giving biased estimates of a when the
whole period is pooled. It is therefore reasonab1e to assume
that in the immediate future, unanticipated returns will have23
roughly the standard scale of the last 10 years, within the
range 1.35 to 1.52. The probability of default and fair value
of insurance are sharply declining functions of the character-
istic exponent (except for extremely risky banks), so in order
not to overstate these values, we will use a relatively high
value ofin this range, namely 1.5, in all our calculations
below.
In the long-run future, we may expect the standard scale
of unanticipated changes to either rise or fall from its level
of the last 10 years. We could probably approximate this com-
pound distribution with a stable distribution using the standard
scale and (apparently biased) characteristic exponent values
estimated for the entire post-Accord period. However, this could
actually give higher estimates of bank riskiness than would
obtain using the past 10 years' estimates, in spite of the lower
standard scales, because of the powerful effect of the lower ct
we would be forced to use in order to capture the uncertainty in
the standard scale. In the interest of keeping our estimates
on the conservative side, we will therefore use the standard
scale estimates for the past 10 years (as extrapolated in the
case of the 20 and 30 year maturities), in conjunction with an
a. value of 1.5 for all maturities and types of asset.
21n footnotes 3 and 4below, the effect of alternate
values of c0 and will be illustrated.24
CAPITAL ADEQUACY: THE PROBABILITY CRITERION
Formula (4) above is based on the one-year standard scale C0,
while Our monthly data have given us the one-month standard
scale ClmO For stable distributions the standard scale accumu-
lates according to the rule
=12Clmoa.
(13)
Therefore, in place of (4) we may use
x= 6kLlogjq)) (14)
to evaluate the annual rate of failure. Recall that k15=.3989.
Table 3 shows the probability per year of failure for
various capital-asset ratios and eight key maturities, using
formula (14). At the high extreme, we see that a bank with 17
capital and a portfolio consisting of nothing but hypothetical
30-year "Treasury bills" would have a failure rate of 9l17 per
year. By this we mean that we would expect it tofail about
9.11 times per year, assuming it were reorganized immediately
after each failure. At the low extreme, we see that a bank
with 907 capital and which rolls over from month to month in
3-month par bonds has a failure rate of .0006757 per year.
That is, the expected time until its next failure is
11.00000675 =148,000years, or something like 25 timesthe
length of recorded history.
In between these extremes, we find more down-to-earth
values. The average capital-asset ratio for the domestic

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bank held a portfolio of one-year maturity par bonds (which is
actuallvsomewhat less than the present average maturity of U.S.
commercial bank assets), its mean rate of failure would be
1.5037 per year, and its expected life to next failure would be
about 66 years, so that it would probably outlive its present
management and depositors.3 If it were to reduce the maturity
of its assets to six months, its failure rate would fall to
O.4697 per year, giving it an expected life of some 213 years.
On the other hand, a thrift institution with 770 capital
and a portfolio of 20-year amortized mortgages has an annual
rate of occurrence of insolvency of 11.897g. For such an insti-
tution, a year sufficiently bad to actually make its net worth
(based on market value) negative would come roughly about once
every 8.41 years. 1966 and 1969 may have been recent examples
of such years. The authorities did not actually close the S&L's
en masse in those years, but rather imposed ceilings on the
rates they were allowed to pay when competing for deposits. The
monopoly-like profits these ceilings gave to the thrift institu-
tions served eventually to restore their battered capital posi-
tions.
Throughout Table 3, we see that the probability of failure
increases sharply with asset maturity, and declines dramatically
with capital-asset ratio. There is therefore a considerable
trade-off between capital and this measure of risk.
3.Using the same 10-year dm0 of .00247 and the actual point
estimate ofof 1.41, this failure rate would instead be 2.307g.
With the 26-year cimo (.001378) and oL(1.25) it is 2.257g.27
The data from Table 3 for par bonds is plotted on double
logarithmic graph paper in Figure 5. A smooth curve has been
fit to the points for each capital-asset ratio. This diagram
essentially depicts a relationship between three variables:
maturity, capital-asset ratio, and probability of default. We
can use this diagram to derive another way of looking at this
relationship, as follows: for any probability (or equivalently,
expected longevity) we are particularly interested in, say 1%
(100 years) or 4% (25 years), we can pick off a set of maturity!
capital asset ratio points that give just the probability
selected. Figure 6 shows the results of this procedure. This
diagram essentially tells us how much capital is adequate to
keep the probability of default below any given level chosen, as
a function of maturity. For example, 9.0% capital would be
necessary to reduce the probability of default to 1% for a bank
with a portfolio of 1 year par bonds. A mere 2.0% capital would
be adequate for this bank if we were content to let it fail once
every 10 years, but 34% capital would be necessary if we insisted
that it not fail but once in a millenium. Similar diagrams could
be constructed for discount instruments or amortized loans.28
Figure 5
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CAPITAL ADEQUACY: FAIR INSURANCE CRITERION
Table 4 shows the annual value of deposit insurance,
expressed as a percentage of liabilities. At the upper extreme
we see that our bank with l7 capital and 30-year Treasury bills
would have to pay the FDIC at the rate of l5.47 of its liabilities
per year in order to compensate the FDIC for the risk it would
run by insuring it. Again, the lower extreme is given by a bank
with 90% capital and a portfolio of 3-month par bonds. This
bank would only have to pay the FDIC a sum equal to .0004447 of
its liabilities per year (i.e., 0.0444 basis points) in order
to fully compensate the FDIC.
Our bank with 7% capital and 1-year par bonds should be
paying a premium of 13.9 basis points.4 The actual premium
charged is set at 1/12% o:f liabilities (8.33 basis points),
regardless of the risk the bank takes. Therefore, even this
relatively safe bank imposes an interest rate risk on the FDIC
that is greater than the total premium charged to cover all the
different types of risk we discussed in the Introduction.
The fair value of insurance increases sharply with asset
maturity in Table 4. The hypothetical thrift institution we dis-
cussed in the previous section, with 7% capital and a portfolio
of 20-year mortgages, imposes a liability worth 110. basis points
on its insuring agency. This high a premium would make a sub-
stantial dent in the gross return it makes on its assets. If it
4With the samedm0 but=1.41,this value becomes 23.4
basis points. With dm0 =.001378and z= 1.25,it becomes 27.3
basis points. Thus our estimates are, if anything, definitely









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































were actually charged this premium, it would quickly try to
change the structure of its balance sheet.(In practice, U.S.
thrift institutions have an average capital ratio more like 67,
which would make the fair premium even higher. On the other hand,
many mortgages are paid off early, making their effective
maturity considerably less than their nominal maturity.)
The data for par bonds from Table 4 have been plotted in
Figure 7. This graph can be used to find combinations of
maturity and capital that generate any particular insurance
value we might be interested in. This derived relationship is
shown in Figure 8.
From Figure 8 we see that l47 capital would be necessary
to make the actual premium of l/l27 adequate for a bank whose
assets consist of one-year bonds. In order for 770 capital to
be adequate, its assets could have no more than 0.73 year (8.8
month) maturities.
In Figure 8, we also include a line for a premium of 1/48%.
This value is of interest, since in recent years the FDIC has
rebated approximately half of the official premium back to the
banks, making the total premium more nearly 1/24%, and since
this reduced premium has to cover many other types of risk
beside pure interest rate risk. If these other types of risk
use up half of the reduced premium, that leaves only 1/48% (2.08
basis points) to cover interest rate risk. We see that asset
maturities would have to be reduced to about 0.34 years (4.1
months) in order to make capital adequate with this low an
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Using the rival normal assumption, Nerton (1977, 10-11)
estimates the fair value of insurance for a bank with 10 percent
capital and a portfolio of long-term U.S. government bonds as
being in the neighborhood of six basis points (Nerton's tau
equals 0.003), if the bank is annually inspected. We see from
Table 4 that with 10 percent capital and 20-year par bonds, the
value of the risk is actually more like 117 basis points per
year. As the bank becomes safer, so that we areconcerned with
events even further out on the tail of the distribution, the
difference becomes still more striking. With 15 percent capital
and 20-year par bonds, we estimate 83.8 basis points, while
Merton's estimate drops below one basis point. Thus, the normal
assumption leads to substantial underestimation of the value of
bank insurance.36
MIXED MATURITY PORTFOLIOS
The fair premium formula for a bank with a given capital-
asset ratio is proportional to c, where c0 is the annualized
standard scale of the unanticipated change in the logarithm of
the value of the bank's assets, assumed thus far to be of one
type. If the bank has a mixed portfolio of assets, we must
instead base our calculation on the variability of the mixed
portfolio. While the product of n log-stable variables with
the same a is log-stable, their sum is not precisely log-stable.
Nevertheless, the sum is approximately log-stable. We will
therefore treat the mixed portfolio as if it really were log-
stable, with standard scale c.
Consider a bank with n types of asset, each of whose returns
are log-stable, and demand liabilities with fixed value. Asset i,S
which by itself has annualized standard scale forms
fraction of the bank's assets, where
=1. (15)
The effective standard scale of the approximately log-stable
mixed portfolio depends in a complicated way on the correlation
of unanticipated returns for the different assets. Two cases
are mathematically tractable: that of zero correlation, in
which case we would have
=il1c, (16)37
and that of perfect positive correlation, in which case we would
have
n
c =e. c.. (17) P i=11 1
Inactual fact, interest rate movements are highly (though by
no means perfectly) correlated across maturities, which means
that the unanticipated returns for different maturities will
also be highly and positively correlated. We therefore regard
(17) as a much better approximation to the truth than (16).
Equation (17) can therefore either be used directly for a
bank with mixed assets, or else a "pure" fair premium iicanbe
found from Table 4 or Figure 7, and these pure premia mixed to
obtain a premium for the entire portfolio, by using the formula
n
1TP
=(J e l/cL)ct (18)
i=1
For example, suppose a bank with 7% capital held 90% of
its assets in 3-month Treasury bills (which would require a
premium of 1.13 basis points by themselves), and 10% of its
assets in 10-year bonds selling near par (requiring 104. basis
points by themselves). The composite premium required for pure
interest rate risk would then be
=(.9(1.13)1/1.5+.1(104)1/1.5)1.5
=5.69basis points. (19)38
Interestingly, this is less than lO7 of the 104. basis point
premium required for a pure 10-year bond portfolio, because of
the nonlinear form of (18).
Formula (18) has an important implication for reserve policy.
Consider a bank that holds fraction r of its assets in the form
of cash reserves, and the remainder in a portfolio which by
itself would require premium r. Formula (18) then implies that
its composite premium should be
=(r0+ (1-r)1)
=(1-r). (20)
Differentiating this formula with respect to r yields
. = -ct(l-r)ir, (21)
so that cash reserves reduce the bankts fair premium, but by an
amount that diminishes as r increases. The maximum reduction
therefore occurs at r =0:
aIr = -c. (22)
r=0
Let i be the expected return on the bank's risky assets.
If cash reserves pay no interest, this is essentially theoppor-
tunity cost to the bank of holding reserves. As long as i is
greater than cur, which it almost surely would be, the bank only39
stands to lose by holding reserves, even the first few dollars
of reserves that have the greatest impact on its fair premium.
With a fair premium, the only reason the bank would voluntarily hold
zero—interest cash would be to minimize transactions costs (which
we have assumed away in the present paper). The size of the
inventory it would hold for this purpose could be modelled along
the lines of the Baumol or Miller and Orr cash balance models.
Zero—interest cash reserves therefore seem to be a relatively
expensive way of providing bank safety. As long as banks pay a
fair premium, coaxing them into short maturity assets, there
seems to be no reason to require them to hold any cash reserves
at all.40
LIABILITY MANAGEMENT
In this paper, we have dealt only with a "traditional bank"
that has only demand or virtually demand liabilities. In recent
years, banks have relied increasingly on longer-term liabilities
or certificates of deposit in order to partially hedge their
long—term assets. This is a desirable development, which would
greatly reduce the riskiness of banks. If a bank perfectly
matched its asset and liability maturities, it would have no
interest rate risk at all. With a little capital, it would have
the flexibility of not having to match perfectly, and could still
maintain zero interest rate risk, provided each contracted dis-
bursement was preceded by contracted receipts. However, bank
capital is limited, so the match would have to be relatively
close.
If all intermediaries tried to match maturiies in this
manner, they would have to juggle the term structure of interest
rates around until savers and borrowers were coaxed into the
same maturities. Elsewhere we have argued that this matching
would improve the efficiency of the intertemporal economy. We
argue that the traditional practice of mismatching maturities
(which we call "misintermediation") actually leads to disequil-
ibrious fluctuations in macroeconomic activity.
We have made no attempt in the present paper to deal with
the difficult problem of how the fair premium should be calculated
for a bank with general mixed asset and liability maturities.
Average duration is of little help, since the asset and liability41
payment profiles could have very different shapes, and still
represent the same average duration. If all the assets have one
maturity, and the liabilities have another maturity, the bank is
roughly equivalent to one with demand liabilities and assets with
maturity equal to the difference. Thus, a thrift institution
with 20—year assets and one-year liabilities is roughly equivalent
to one with 19-year assets and passbook liabilities.
Clearly if thrift institutions are to continue to grant long-
term mcirtgages (as they should), they must hold comparably long-
term liabilities in order to avoid expensive interest rate risk.
Present restrictions on the terms they may offer on retail CD's
should therefore be removed. In particular, these CD's should
not be subject to artificial penalties if the depositor wishes
to rediscount his deposit on terms that are favorable to the
bank, should be negotiable or assignable in order to guarantee
the depositor competitive rediscount terms should he change his
financial plans, and should place no fixed dollar obligation on
the bank prior to the agreed upon maturity.
The "Liquid Asset Mutual Funds" that appeared in the early
70's represent another type of intermediary with perfectly matcheu
asset and liability maturities and therefore no interest rate
risk. Here the liabilities are actually shares in the current
market value of the assets. The depositors are in effect self-
insuring against the small interest rate risk inherent in the
fund's short—term assets. However, the fund's assets are so
stable in value that the depositor (shareholder) can be virtually
assured of his deposit's current value. Therefore it is practical42
to allow the depositor to write checks against the current value
of his shares. Many of these funds indeed allow such checks,
though at present only for relatively large amounts, such as
$500 or over. These funds present an interesting alternative to
the traditional bank.
INDEXED AND VARIABLE RATE LOANS
Much of the volatility in interest rates in recent years
has been due to the uncertainty of inflation. Long—term loan
assets that are indexed to the cost of living would therefore
probably have a substantially more certain return over a short
holding period, and therefore might justify lower insurance
premiums, provided they were offset on the balance sheet by an
equal value of indexed liabilities.
Indexed loans would have the additional advantage of
reducing default risk, since a sudden unanticipated end to infla-
tion today when nominal interest rates contain a substantial
inflation premium would make it just as difficult for borrowers
to repay as it was for them in 1929-1933, when there was a sudden
unanticipated deflation while homeowners and farmers were committed
to interest rates that would have been appropriate for constant
prices. Defaults on such loans were a major cause of the wave
of bank failures during those years. A sudden end to inflation
could cause comparable problems today, unless bank balance sheets
are indexed to the cost of living.43
In spite of their desirable properties, indexed loans have
apparently been, until very recently, illegal and unenforceable
in the courts, under the second sentence of the 1933 Gold Clause
Joint Resolution. (See Aztec Properties vs. Union Planters
National Bank, 530 SW 2d, 760-761, and the U.S. Supreme Court
Cases cited there.) It was not until October 1977 that this
law was repealed.
Denied indexed loans as a means of avoiding inflation uncer-
tainty in long-term nominal interest rates, many banks have turned
to "variable rate loans", whose nominal interest rates are tied
to some index of short term nominal interest rates. These loans
substitute a series of relatively accurate short-run inflation
forecasts for a relatively inaccurate long—run inflation forecast,
so they do reduce inflation uncertainty to a degree, though not
entirely. The effective maturity of these variable—rate loans
is ambiguous for our purposes. If they had the same default
risk as ordinary loans, they could be taken as having maturity
equal to their interest computation interval, rather than the
longer, actual maturity of the loan. However, since they leave
the real interest rate on long—term loans uncertain, the real
portion of the interest rate risk is borne by the borrower, rather
than by the bank. On paper, the bank does not face real interest
rate risk from these loans, but in practice, the real interest
rate risk may simply be disguised as default risk. All in all,
these variable rate loans are inferior substitutes for fixed—rate
indexed loans. Unless there are other hidden legal barriers to
indexation, variable rate loans will probably soon disappear.44
THE "GOING BUSINESS" VALUE OF THE BANK
For our calculations above, we have assumed that as soon
as a bank has negative net worth (based on current market value
of assets), the stockholders will take the option of allowing
the bank to be liquidated, so that their stock becomes worthless
and the insuring agency pays off the depositors in full. In
practice, a bank with negative net worth may actually be finan-
cially viable, in the sense that eventually it may be able to
pay off its liabilities with interest out of the income from its
assets.
There are two reasons it may be able to do this. The first
is the value of its customer relations. In fact financial markets
are not perfect, so that the bank receives a sort of rent from
the fact that it has evaluated the creditworthiness of certain
customers who are unknown to other banks. To the extent this is
true, the shareholders will be willing to put up additional capital
or to dilute their own stock with outside capital in order to
prevent the bank from being liquidated. Market imperfections are
the stuff day-to-day business is made of, so it is important that
a bank with negative net worth based on tangible assets be given
a fair chance to raise more capital before liquidating it.
The second reason is the monopoly value of the bank's charter.
Since 1935, entry into banking has been severely restricted. The
value of t!te existing charters has been further enhanced bi the
zero interest ceiling on checking accounts (outside of New England),
and by Regulation Q-type ceilings on time and savings account
interest.45
Rather than destroy the monopoly value of the charter of a
bank that is unable to meet its current obligations by liquidating
it immediately, the policy of the FDIC has usually been to manage
its receivership of the bank so as to recover as much as is
possible for the shareholders. Because of the monopoly rents to
the bank's charter, it may well be able to recover something, or
even put the bank back into business, in spite of the fact that
its net worth based on tangible assets had once been negative.
The above-mentioned restrictions on competition cannot be
considered in isolation from the issue of bank safety. They were
originally introduced shortly after the massive bank failures of
1929-1933 in the hopes that greater profitability would make
banks safer. This hope was illusory. Pouring profits into a
bank in order to make it safer is comparable to trying to carry
water across a room in a sieve: the profits may immediately flow
out of the bank in the form of dividends to shareholders. The
monopoly profits might instead be retained and added to economic
capital, and to that extent would indirectly make the bank safer.
But the bank would be just as safe if the capital were raised by
any other means.
If banks paid competitive interest on deposits, but were
charged a fair premium for deposit insurance, they would be forced
to pass the premium on to depositors, in the form of reduced
interest. Therefore fair insurance would cost the demand deposit
owner several basis points, depending on the maturity of the bank's
assets. The above restrictions on competition, on the other hand,46
cost the depositor several hundred basis points. They are there-
fore an extremely costly, not to mention ineffective, means of
providing bank safety. In a study of bank risk and capital
adequacy, they cannot be taken as immutable institutional back-
ground, since they exist in the name of bank safety. If they were
abolished, a large part of the "going business" value of the bank
would be eliminated. The simple model we have used above would
then be a more realistic one.
CONCLUS ION
It should be remembered that the estimates in this paper are
only point estimates. By using as high a value for the charac-
teristic exponent as seemed justified by the data, we have tried
to make our estimates of the fair value of insurance err, if anything,
on the low side.These estimates might be improved upon, possibly
by using the maximum likelihood estimating procedures for stable
parameters that have been recently developed by William DuMouchel
of the MIT Mathematics Department, or possibly by using an alterna-
tive leptokurtic distribution model, such as Student's t. All
these procedures will give different point estimates. Nevertheless,
the burden of proof should be on the banks to show at a high level
of significance that the premium they are paying to governmental
insuring agencies is at least sufficient to cover the fair value
of insurance for the risks that they are incurring.47
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